2 responses to “Rhythmic Syntax, Granularity, and Future of the Interdisciplinarian”
-
Dear Elliot
Thanks for expanding on our commentary (nice title for the post, btw!). Allow me to address/correct a few points. I think the best way to do this is if I focus on specific passages of your text, since the general points were made in the commentary Constantina and I published today. I’ll be brief.
To recap and contextualize what follows: we stress two things in that commentary (more so than in previous publications of mine, btw; full credit to my co-author here). (a) computational ethology, as you outlined it in LCC, may not be feasible, and (b) the primacy and absolute necessity to take the ‘vertical dimension’ of Boeckx and Theofanopoulou (2014) [your Figure 5 in LCC] into account.
Given this, let me take issue with the following passages of your blog post.
“[Boeckx and Theofanopoulou] expand the discussion of the computational capacities of non-humans”: we crucially don’t do this. We in fact note that we cannot determine these comp. capacities at the level of granularity that you choose to formulate the Labeling claim. Not just in other species. In other cognitive domains for humans as well. Think of the range of tests linguists have developed over decades to determine constituency, locality, etc. And they still disagree on things like the necessity of labels! We have nothing like this for the rest of cognition/species. So, how can we begin to apply the comparative method in your computational ethology approach? You say that “LCC makes clear what kind of evidence is needed to falsify the Labeling Hypothesis at the behavioural level”. I am sorry, but I very much doubt this. Did you ever see linguists ‘falsifying’ each other’s favorite computational claims? Was that easy? [the last question is rhetorical]. So, I find it surprising that you can write that “the short-term goals discussed in LCC are just as important”, because short-term-wise, I don’t know how we can get computational comparisons off the ground.
I understand the “reasons of space and focus”, but this is not just a matter of focus. (Remember our lip-smacking example in the commentary: in terms of brain oscillations, lip-smacks and syllables are one and the same. But syllables are unique to humans. This should make you worry.) It seems to me that the fine-grained computational properties you stress is one of the things that make Poeppel’s granularity problem harder. We don’t believe that ” the discussion of brain dynamics (the ‘dynome’; Koppell et al. 2014) in LCC is insufficient to act as a serious alternative to the Chomsky Hierarchy” Rather, brain dynamics suggest a quite different comparative program (one much closer to Darwinian descent, I think).
The point is not to “ground the cognome in the workings of brain dynamics, specifically oscillations”, but to reconstruct the cognome from the bottom up, taking seriously the idea that computations will be elementary and generic (and so claims about human uniqueness unhelpful).
You write that “computational ethology is not incommensurable with neuroethology”. I beg to differ. And I’m not alone. Though he draws different conclusions from me, Gallistel stresses the gap between the computational and the neuro. Currently, you can’t marry these two. Especially, if you adhere to a rich notion of computation, of the sort linguists adopt. “Shifting ethology towards a finer grained computational analysis” won’t do, because it will simply make Poeppel’s granularity problem harder.
I will not comment too much on your speculations concerning Broca’s role, etc. I’m skeptical, especially about your take on Labeling and the dorsal stream, since labeling appears to matter a lot to construct semantic representations [this was the topic of Aritz Irurtzun’s nice PhD thesis from a few years ago] but I’ll wait until I see the account fleshed out. Concerning your use of my paper with Constantina and Javi on brain rhythms, let me stress that I think you fail to appreciate how much an analysis at the dynome level transforms our understanding of what one finds at the level of the cognome. The main difference for us is that labeling cannot be so exceptional as you claim (and we certainly don’t attribute linguistic sub-operations to specific brain frequencies; it is their conjunctions that matter). In fact, I think the dynome renders notion like labeling, syntax, language, etc. pretty vacuous in a biolinguistic context.–cedric
-
Thanks for the reply Cedric, the advice and guidance is much appreciated and I think I’m beginning to understand the real implications for the cognome, I’ll definitely address these considerations in future work. I suppose it’s hard to let go of notions like ‘labeling’ and ‘language’ when they seem to do so much explanatory work for you, but since we currently lack joint cognome-dynome terminology it seems inevitable that ‘set-formation’, ‘labeling’ and ‘atomization’ will be around – at least on some level of analysis – for a while. Given your point that the goal is to reconstruct the cognome from the bottom up, rather than freely import syntactic constructs, I’m now even more sympathetic to the multidimensional framework outlined in Boeckx & Theofanopoulou (2014), whilst also bearing in mind one of Poeppel’s original major concerns about the possibilities of computational studies directing and delimiting biophysical investigations. At the computational level, I’m still convinced of the FLN-esque centrality of labeling, something which I don’t think has been appreciated over the last five years of intensive work into the labeling algorithm (see Figure 3 in LCC), and reminding ourselves of labeling effects (and not just ‘concatenation effects’) when conducting animal behavioural studies will not only produce a more precise ethology, but will also encourage interdisciplinary discussion and, hopefully, collaboration. In addition, the project of relocating the universality of Universal Grammar to the dynome, and away from the genome – where there are surprising layers of variation – seems to me to be the appropriate task for biolinguistics, and as I said in the blog the importance of novel experimental paradigms, and not just theoretical commensurability, should not be underestimated.
Elliot
-


Leave a comment